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Introduction
    This essay examines different interpretations of the Meiji Restoration. In particular, 
it shows how former Tokugawa retainers, men who were on the losing side of Japan's civil 
war, sought to contest an "official" narrative of events that was emerging in the 1880s. The 
historical works of Katsu Kaishu (1823-1899) will be highlighted. In the 1880s and early 
1890s Katsu was placed in charge of organizing the documentary record of the old regime. 
He compiled a series of histories covering the military, diplomatic, and financial fortunes of 
the Tokugawa family. Katsu was himself a key actor in the Restoration drama. Aside from 
these institutional histories, he published several accounts of the events of the 1860s based on 
his personal experience. His view of the Meiji Restoration and his evaluation of the legacy of 
Tokugawa rule offer a critical alternate interpretation of the birth of modern Japan. 
    Three questions inform this paper. How did Katsu Kaishu-a man who played a leading 
role in the events of 1868, a man who was on the "losing side"-view the Meiji Restoration 
as "history"? Why were he and others engaged in a flurry of historiographical work in the late 
1880s and early 1890s? Finally, the paper makes inquiries into the relationship between nar-
ratives of the past and engagement with domestic and foreign issues of the present. Alternate 
readings of the Meiji Restoration held by Katsu Kaishu and Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901), 
for example, relate directly to the different prescriptions they proffered for Japanese foreign 
policy in the period leading up to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. Katsu, representa-
tive of the old regime, was opposed to war in Asia and urged mediation and a peaceful solu-
tion, much as he had done in negotiating the bloodless surrender of Edo Castle; Fukuzawa, 
the Westernizer, was strangely the champion of bushido and martial solutions leading to 
Japanese hegemony in Asia. Now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, as then, history 
wars over events such as the Meiji Restoration continue to influence the way people look at 
their nation and their world.
The Creation of an Orthodox View of the Meiji Restoration 
    What was the Meiji Restoration? When did it begin and when did it end? What was 
its significance? In the late 1860s some commoners interpreted the Restoration in millen-
nial overtones. The god-emperor would bring on a new age of social renovation (yonaoshi). 
Adherents of the nativist teaching (kokugaku) envisioned the restoration of an ancient order 
of imperial rule in which Japan would sweep away the pollution of foreign Chinese and 
Western influences. The Satsuma and Choshu men who engineered the palace coup in late 
1867 were more practical. Using the imperial symbol, they sought to unite the nation and 
carry out reforms designed to preserve Japanese independence. Foreign observers were equally
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divided in their immediate evaluation of the events of 1868. The British press hailed the 
revolution that would place Japan on the path of civilization, while the American press was 
more cynical. The New York Times described the inauguration of the new imperial regime as 
follows: "The mikado, who has been slowly and painfully emerging from the seclusion of 
centuries, like a butterfly from its chrysalis, has at length consummated the act, thanks to 
my Lord Satsuma, and has celebrated it by a royal coronation. In the imperial city of Kioto, 
at 8 o'clock A.M., on Oct. 12, year of grace 1868, the splendid farce was enacted, and the 
poor boy, born a priest and educated a woman, was dragged out to play the King for the 
pleasure of the Southern Daimios."1 Enomoto Takeaki (1836-1908) and others who fought 
the new regime to the bitter end had even harsher words. The new imperial government was 
a sham: "The deliberations of the imperial government do not result from public discussion, 
but simply from the private views of one or two domains."Z Enomoto set up a rival regime, a 
republic, in Hokkaido. 
    By the spring of 1869 Enomoto had been defeated, the civil war was over, and the new 
government was in firm control of the country. Gradually the differing views of what had 
taken place in 1868 coalesced into a common "official" narrative. 1868 was not a revolution, 
but a restoration of imperial rule (osei fukko). The historical slate was to be wiped clean. The 
Restoration marked a new beginning, similar to the inaugural rule of Emperor Jinmu (trad. 
r. 660-585 B.C.E.). The emperor and his supporters had overthrown the forces of tradi-
tion. The corrupt, weak, and self-serving rule of the Tokugawa family was no more; it had 
been replaced by the enlightened and selfless rule of Emperor Meiji (1852-1912). Under the 
leadership of the emperor, Japan would be able to lay the foundations for a strong, rich, and 
independent nation-state.' 
    The problem of history was a priority of the new regime. As early as 1869, Emperor 
Meiji ordered the compilation of a history of Japan in order to "set right the relation between 
monarch and subject, to make clear the distinction between civilization and barbarity, and to 
implant the principle of virtue throughout the empire."4 A government history bureau was es-
tablished, the forerunner of the Historiographical Institute (Shiryo Hensanjo) now at Tokyo 
University, and among other projects the massive task of compiling documents relating to 
the course of the Meiji Restoration was begun. The Fukkoki (Records of the Restoration) and 
Meiji shiyo (Outline of Meiji History) were completed in 1889.5 This monumental collection 
in its modern reprint edition consists of fifteen thick volumes of documents. Although high 
standards of positivistic research were to be employed, the histories were clearly intended to 
provide legitimacy to the imperial government. Document after document showed clearly 
how "men of determination" and loyalist daimyo fought on behalf of the imperial cause in 
the waning days of Tokugawa rule. 
    In the Meiji period other schools of history emerged. Of particular interest is the so-
called "history of civilization" (bunmei shiron) school that was influenced by current trends 
in Western historiography. Henry Thomas Buckle's (1821-1862) History of Civilization in 
England and Francois Guizot's (1787-1874) General History of Civilization in Europe were 
both translated into Japanese in the early 1870s.' Their concern with progress and develop-
ment lent weight to arguments that the old regime had been a drag on Japan's advance toward 
civilization. Such were the conclusions of Taguchi Ukichi's (1855-1905) Nihon kaika shoshi 
(A Short History of Japan's Enlightenment), published in 1877.8 Fukuzawa Yukichi was an-
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other proponent of enlightenment history. His analysis of the causes of the Meiji Restoration, 
contained in An Outline of a Theory of Civilization, is instructive.' He noted that before the 
Restoration "the Japanese people had suffered for many years under the yoke of despotism. 
Lineage was the basis of power.... Throughout the land there was no room for human initia-
tive; everything was in a condition of stagnation."10 But Fukuzawa had to admit that even in 
all that stagnation, there was some progress and by the end of the Tokugawa period people 
were frustrated and ready for action. Commodore Perry's arrival in the 1850s provided the 
opportunity for reform. "People actually set eyes on foreigners and heard them speak, read 
Western books and translations, increasingly broadened their horizons, and then woke up to 
the fact that a government, even a demonic one, could be overthrown by human powers."" 
For Fukuzawa, the Meiji Restoration was certainly the occasion for "bright rule," bringing an 
end to the darkness that had long prevailed over the Japanese people. He and other enlighten-
ment scholars, as Tanaka Akira (b. 1928) notes, were easily able to accommodate themselves 
to establishment views of the Restoration. 12 The young emperor was doubly confirmed as the 
legitimate force behind Japan's struggle to gain recognition as one of the civilized nations of 
the world.
Alternate Narratives
    In the early years of the Meiji period there were few who contested this official view of 
the past. The Meiji Restoration was the work of patriotic young men from the Southwestern 
domains, especially Satsuma and Choshu. They had restored the emperor to his rightful place, 
and under his leadership they sought to create a new Japan. As Ito Hirobumi (1841-1909) 
said in his famous "Hinomaru" speech given in San Francisco, "Japan is anxious to press 
forward. The red disk in the centre of our national flag shall no longer appear like a wafer 
over a sealed empire, but henceforth be in fact what it is designed to be, the noble emblem 
of the rising sun, moving onward and upward amid the enlightened nations of the world."" 
By the late 1870s and into the 1880s, however, some people began to adopt a different view 
of Japan's past. Ueki Emori (1857-1892) and other thinkers related to the People's Rights 
Movement, for example, could see in the Meiji Restoration the onset of despotic rule rather 
than its destruction." By the end of the 1870s he and other People's Rights activists were call-
ing for a "second Meiji Restoration" in order to replace autocratic rule with that of a parlia-
mentary system. By the same token, they found inspiration in the "public discussion" (koron) 
discourse active in the late Tokugawa period. Goto Shojiro (1838-1897), leader of the Daido 
Danketsu Movement in the 1880s, dismissed the emperor from the center of the Restoration. 
Instead he saw the events of the late 1860s as a revolution that fought for people's rights and 
national independence. 15 
    Writers whosesympathies lay with the former Tokugawa regime; some of them former 
Tokugawa retainers such as Katsu Kaishu, were among the most influential critics of the 
official narrative of the Restoration. 16 Some of them, like the founders of the Edo Kai (Edo 
Association), sought to establish a more positive memory of Tokugawa society. The first is-
sue of their journal, Edo kaishi, published on 26 August 1888 (the 300`h anniversary to the 
day of Ieyasu's entry into Edo), emphasized the outstanding debt modern Japan owed to the 
Tokugawa past, not the least of which was a tradition of peace, stability, and moral integrity.
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According to them, the Tokugawa era was "the period in which Japanese civilization achieved 
its greatest progress and development." 17 Instead of progress, the members of the Edo Kai 
feared that the period since the Restoration was leading Japan in the wrong direction."' 
    Another group, equally nostalgic for the past, sought to give primacy of place to the 
Tokugawa in narrating the events of the Restoration. Fukuchi Gen'ichiro (Ochi, 1841-1906), 
a former bakufu retainer who distinguished himself in the Meiji Period as editor of the Tokyo 
nichinichi shinbun, wrote a series of histories of the bakufu and bakufu leaders that told the 
story of the Restoration from the Tokugawa point of view. His Bakufu suibo ron (On the Col-
lapse of the Tokugawa Shogunate), published in 1892, is the most famous. He was conscious 
of the newness of his approach: "Earlier works may have been studies of the Meiji Restora-
tion, but they fail to describe the fall of the bakufu.""9 He defended the Tokugawa family 
against charges of disloyalty to the throne. And while the narrowness of the Tokugawa feudal 
system could be blamed for its downfall, he did credit the regime with the ability to carry out 
reform. It was the bakufu, he noted, that decided to open the country to the outside world in 
the 1850s; and it was the anti-foreignism of Choshu and Satsuma that was the real cause of 
the Tokugawa family's failure to insure stability in the 1860s.20
Katsu Kaishu
       Katsu Kaishu is known primarily for his role as mediator in the last days of Tokuga-
wa rule.21 It was he who represented the Tokugawa side in the negations with Saigo Takamori 
(1828-1877) over the surrender of Edo Castle in the spring of 1868. Born in 1823 into the 
house of an impoverished retainer of the Tokugawa family, Katsu had obtained training in 
Western military science and because of that come to the attention of ranking bakufu of-
ficials after the visits by Commodore Perry and his warships in 1853 and 1854. Employed 
by the shogunate, Katsu worked on behalf of naval reform and in 1860 was captain of the 
Kanrinmaru as it sailed across the Pacific, carrying the first Tokugawa mission to the United 
States. During the 1860s his attempt to create a truly national navy failed. He criticized 
bakufu policies that sought to strengthen the Tokugawa at the expense of the other daimyo. 
This earned him a good reputation in the anti-bakufu domains of Satsuma and Choshu. In 
1868, in command of all Tokugawa forces, he tried to obtain terms of surrender generous to 
the Tokugawa family, but failed.22 
    In the Meiji period Katsu served as advisor to the new government. Between 1872 and 
1875 he held the important office of Naval Minister. Despite his entry into the new govern-
ment, he did not slacken his commitment to the Tokugawa family. He helped to establish a 
Tokugawa banking institution designed specifically to grant loans to needy former retainers 
of the Tokugawa and their families. He organized fund-raising societies for the repair and 
preservation of Tokugawa family temples and shrines. In 1880, for example, he set up the 
Hoko Society for the repair of the Toshogu Shrine in Nikko. Finally, he sought reconciliation 
between the imperial household and the Tokugawa family. His aim was to erase once and 
for all the stigma of the designation "enemy of the court" that had hung over the Tokugawa 
family since 1868. 
    On 2 March 1898, Katsu was successful in arranging a special audience with the Meiji 
emperor and empress for Tokugawa Keiki (Yoshinobu, 1837-1913), the last shogun. In his
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diary entry for that day, in an unsteady hand, the old Tokugawa retainer asked: "Have my 
efforts for'the past thirty years at last made some headway?"23 For him the Meiji Restora-
tion may have begun with the "Restoration of Imperial Rule" edict of the 12.9.1867, but 
it did not end with the takeover of Edo Castle, or with imperial victory in the war against 
the Northeastern League or against Enomoto and the Hokkaido Republic. In Katsu's mind 
the Meiji Restoration ended only in 1898 with the recovery of honor by the Tokugawa fam-
ily. Less than one year later, in January 1899, he died. By the traditional reckoning, he had 
reached the auspicious age of seventy-seven.24 
    Katsu's activities in the 1880s included the compilation and editing of documents relat-
ing to the history of the Tokugawa bakufu, especially in its final years. His histories of bakufu 
financial institutions, Suijinroku (five volumes) and Suijin yoroku (one volume), appeared 
in 1887.25 His history of the bakufu navy, Kaigun rekishi (two volumes), was published in 
1888,26 followed by a history of the army, Rikugun rekishi (three volumes), published in 
1890," and a history of late Tokugawa foreign relations, Kaikoku kigen (Origins of the Open-
ing of the Country, five volumes), published in 1893.28 A project was begun, but never com-
pleted, to compile documents relating to the history of Edo Castle. Considering the breadth 
and depth of the work-the histories comprise fifteen volumes in the Keiso Shobo edition 
of his collected works-it is surprising that these texts have received little scholarly attention. 
Studies of Katsu Kaishu, and there are many, normally end with his role in the 1868 civil war. 
Some books note his role in the 1873 debate over Korea and other foreign policy issues in the 
Meiji period (he was, for example, one of the few Meiji statesmen opposed to war with China 
in the 1890s), but scant mention is given to his work as a historian. Similarly, studies on 
Meiji historiography overlook Katsu's achievement as an historian. Tanaka Akira's otherwise 
excellent essay on pro-bakufu views of the Restoration makes no mention of Katsu's histo-
ries.29 Similarly, Okubo Toshiaki's (1900-1995) study of the formation of modern Japanese 
historiography omits Katsu and other former bakufu retainers, although it does cover works 
relating to the role of the domains during the Restoration.30 Yet exactly because they provide 
an alternative reading to the official narrative of the Meiji Restoration, Katsu's histories are 
valuable, and moreover they preserve many Tokugawa official documents that have since been 
destroyed by fire and other disasters.
 The History of Bakufu Finances: Suijinroku 
     The first of Katsu's histories was the Suijinroku, a history of bakufu finances, of 1887. It 
 was based on the now-lost archives of the bakufu treasury (kanjo bugyo). It that regard alone, 
 the five volumes of documents-touching on topics such as population, taxes, river manage-
 ment, currency, and stipends-are an invaluable resource for students of Tokugawa period 
 social and economic history. The title of the collection is difficult to translate: "A Record 
 of Dust Blown Away" hardly sounds felicitous. The title does, however, contain interesting 
 clues about Katsu's purpose in compiling these documents. It refers to a famous dream of 
 the legendary Yellow Emperor. The Yellow Emperor, like others of the early sage kings, was 
 in constant search for the secret of good government. In his dream the Yellow Emperor sees 
 dust being swept from heaven. The dream is interpreted, through a series of linguistic twists, 
 to indicate the imminent arrival of an able administrator who would assist the emperor in
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bringing about reform." Katsu's preface to the Suijinroku refers to this legend. "Life is but a 
single long night.... It is all a dream. This book is but the telling of a dream in a dream."32 
On the one hand Katsu was dusting off old documents that might well be a meaningless task. 
On the other hand, Katsu thought the example of the Tokugawa age could provide valuable 
lessons for contemporary political and economic problems. Indeed, upon completing the 
manuscript, Katsu personally delivered a copy to Matsukata Masayoshi (1835-1924), the 
Minister of Finance. 
    Matsukata, from Satsuma and a dozen years junior to Katsu, had assumed the posi-
tion of Minister of Finance in 1881, and had immediately implemented measures to reduce 
the amount of paper currency in circulation, divest government-operated enterprises, cut 
government spending, raise taxes, and establish a central bank. The effect of these policies 
was deflationary, and though certain of the measures proved advantageous to rich landlords 
and industrialists, they hurt small farmers and the urban poor. The government used force 
to suppress a series of rural riots demanding more equal distribution of wealth and power. 
By 1885, the people's rights movement had been silenced and the government was at work 
devising a constitution that would solidify the position of the emperor as "sacred and invio-
lable." At the same time education became progressively nationalist in content, capped by the 
1890 Imperial Rescript on Education. By the time the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) broke 
out, the Meiji state had fully elaborated the imperial system that remained in force through 
the Second World War. In a sense, these developments marked the fulfillment of the Meiji 
Restoration as the advent of a benevolent but absolute imperial reign. 
    Such too were the findings of official history projects such as the Fukkoki and the Meiji 
shiyo, both completed, as noted earlier, in 1889. Needless to say, Katsu and other formerly 
pro-Tokugawa writers objected to these conclusions. Like the prominent journalist (and one-
time bakufu interpreter) Fukuchi Gen'ichiro, Katsu gave little credit to the pro-Kyoto forces 
when he composed his account of the Restoration. The bakufu had overextended itself; its 
attempt at absolute hegemony was the cause of civil war. Katsu was critical of Tokugawa 
leadership which had failed to "care for the people" (bokumin) as its first priority. Katsu, like 
Fukuchi, placed emphasis on the "fall" of the bakufu rather than the "restoration" of the 
emperor. 
    Katsu's Suijinroku can also be read as criticism of Matsukata's economic policies in the 
1880s. On 8 May 1887, the same year as Suijinroku was published, Katsu was awarded the 
title of count (hakushaku). He attempted to refuse the honor, and when that was unsuccess-
ful, managed to avoid the knighting ceremony by pleading illness. By way of making amends 
for his absence, he paid a visit to Ito Hirobumi, prime minister at the time, on 25 May, to 
express his gratitude. He had more than thanks on his mind, however, and he used this occa-
sion to submit a twenty-point memorial criticizing the economic, political, diplomatic, and 
cultural policies of the day." He voiced particular concern over the dominant role played by 
Satsuma and Choshu men in government affairs. Favoritism and political infighting should 
be strictly avoided and the welfare of the common people should be given first priority. "The 
poverty of the people," Katsu warned, "leads to the poverty of government." Measures for tax 
relief should be enacted, and military conscription should, in part, be replaced by alternate 
service, especially donations of labor for railroad construction. Despotism must be rejected 
and reform must be gradual, always taking the people's interests into consideration. China,
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Japan's neighbor, must be given the respect it deserved. Trade with China should be encour-
aged and made the basis of Japan's economic strength. "We should not view the Chinese as 
enemies, but rather have intercourse with them on a basis of trust." Finally, Katsu criticized 
the recent vogue of ballroom dancing. "Recently high officials, unbefitting their station, have 
been attending parties and night entertainments and in other ways swimming in extrava-
gance."34 This was a jab at Ito and Matsukata and other government leaders who had joined 
in the Western-style socializing of the elite at the Rokumeikan, dancing the night away, in 
Katsu's view, while small farmers were forced into tenancy and consumer taxes cut deep into 
the livelihood of the poorer members of society. Implied was a warning that the Meiji lead-
ers in the late 1880s were heading down the same path as the bakufu had taken in the late 
1860s. 
    Moreover, Suijinroku indirectly criticized Matsukata's economic policies by drawing 
(unfavorable) contrasts with Tokugawa ideals. Taxes, he maintained, were lower and collected 
with more fairness during the Tokugawa period. Good government should seek to "care for 
the people" and be receptive to popular grievances. Tokugawa laws had provided the basis 
for a well-ordered and stable society; reforms were undertaken and laws changed only after 
mature consideration, and then on a careful and gradual basis. 
    Katsu was one of the first to add a golden touch to descriptions of Edo period society. 
Indeed, his positive reflections on the Edo period are strikingly similar to later attempts by 
scholars to rescue the pre-Meiji past from darkness and feudal decadence." But between the 
lines of Katsu's texts emerge sharp criticisms of the Meiji regime. Its zeal on behalf of change 
meant that Tokugawa laws and customs were discarded. The new system, however, failed to 
provide for social stability, and meant that in many ways the people were worse off. Katsu's 
conclusion was that the experience of the Edo period continued to be relevant to the sorts of 
problems confronting Japan in the years well after the Meiji Restoration. There were positive 
lessons to be learned and warnings to be heeded.
Katsu's Restoration
    Aside from Katsu's work in preserving the record of the Tokugawa bakufu, he left several 
narrative accounts of the last days of the old regime. Here Katsu often wrote from first-hand 
experience, basing himself on his (at the time unpublished) diary." These works include 
Kainanroku (Explaining Difficulties, 1884), DanchOki (A Record of Grief, 1888), GaikO yosei 
(The Power of Diplomacy, 1889), and Bakufu shimatsu (Last Days of the Bakufu, 1895).37 Fi-
nally, in his later years, Katsu published his (dictated) memoirs (Hikawa seiwa [Conversations 
with the Sage of Hikawa], 1898) and a collection of interviews (Kaishu zadan [Conversations 
with Kaishu], 1899).38 
    Although he enjoyed government sponsorship for his historiographical endeavors, 
Katsu's account of the Restoration differs greatly from "official" narratives. Indeed, he may 
well have been prompted to contest the record that was itself emerging in the late 1880s. 
His version of the Restoration paid scant attention to the young Meiji emperor and his loyal 
supporters. Like that of Fukuchi Gen'ichiro, it focused instead on the fall of the bakufu. His 
hero was the last shogun, Tokugawa Keiki, and the climax of his drama came with the peace-
ful surrender of Edo Castle in the spring of 1868 and not the military coup that restored the
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ancient imperial system in the last month of 1867. What follows is a summary of Katsu's 
account of the "last days of the bakufu," following the text of the Bakufu shimatsu, written in 
the mid-1880s, but not published until 1895.3 
    Tokugawa Keiki returned to Edo on the twelfth day of the first month, 1868, after 
Tokugawa troops had been defeated in their attempt to re-take the Imperial Palace in Kyoto. 
Katsu's narrative of the events becomes detailed from this point up to the surrender of Edo 
Castle on the eleventh day of the fourth month. "After Keiki returned to Edo and re-entered 
the Castle, the excitement of the hatamoto, various officials, and their retainers was extreme. 
... They spoke of nothing but mad, absurd, violent plots of reprisal. They were out of con-
trol. It was like a huge hive of wild bees broken loose."40 Oguri Tadamasa (1827-1868) and 
others pressed the deposed shogun to continue to fight, but according to Katsu, Keiki had 
determined otherwise. On the eleventh day of the second month, he announced his inten-
tion to surrender and entered domiciliary confinement. Katsu was pleased with the decision, 
but other retainers pushed for war. "We can stop the imperial army at Hakone pass, unite 
the lords of the Kanto, and make a solid defense." Some said that "if Keiki were personally 
to lead the troops, he could invigorate their bushi spirit and make them passionate warriors." 
Still others wanted to send warships to attack Osaka, and many simply shouted, "Subdue 
Satsuma and Choshu!"41 
    According to Katsu's account, Keiki attempted to curb their bellicose spirit: "I wholly 
respect the imperial decision and wish to apologize for the errors I have committed. Although 
there is reason to be resentful, if we fight and there is no reconciliation, we will commit the 
same mistakes as India and China and the entire nation will collapse. I cannot bear to cause 
the people suffering. My guilt will pile up and increasingly I will incur the anger of the em-
peror. You retainers should understand me and not create any violent uprising. Those who do 
not heed me and act rashly are no retainers of mine."42 
    Katsu reports his own warning against rash actions, in which he stressed that although 
victory was possible, submission was the most advantageous course of action: 
     If we decide now upon a course of war, both high and low must be resolved to of-
     fer their lives. First, I will lead warships to Suruga and land two to three hundred 
     troops there. The imperial army will attack, and the odds being against our troops, 
     we will no doubt suffer defeat. Thereupon, the enemy troopswill take advantage of 
     the situation and advance. When they get close to Kiyomigaseki our warships will 
     attack them from the side. In this way we can certainly breakup the enemy. Simul-
     taneously, our troops should engage them in hand-to-hand warfare while cannon 
     power from the warships breaks up the nucleus of their army. In this way we will 
     immediately gain a victory. Taking advantage of this, the Kantomilitary spirit will 
     flourish. Immediately we will urge our eastern allies to set fires and prevent the 
     [pro-court, anti-bakufu] army from communicating with each other and regroup-
     ing. Then I will lead three warships to Osaka Harbor and cut communications 
     between the western and middle provinces, both by land and sea, and if necessary 
     the city of Osaka can be reduced to ashes by the fire of our ships. Thus the base of 
     supply for provisions for Kyoto being cut off, we may calmly view the situation and 
      await the result.43
Katsu continued,however, to note that victory would only be illusory; instead of a reassertion
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of Tokugawa control over the nation, military hostilities would lead to foreign domination. 
"But still the nation will collapse, because the lords of Kyushu will give free play to their wild 
spirit through the English."44 The only way to avoid national humiliation, Katsu reasoned, 
was to surrender to the imperial forces. 
    Katsu continued his narrative by citing the alternative plan of actionthat he had pro-
posed: "The spirit of the Kanto forces for war is, I confess, the spirit of passion. If we could 
only demonstrate our peaceful intention, with the sole purpose of tranquility, for the hap-
piness and safety of the people, and are willing to sacrifice our personal interests and pos-
sessions, to surrender even our arms and castles, thus leaving the fate of the House of the 
Tokugawa to the will of Heaven, and this for the sake of our common country, then will 
nothing be able to harm us."45 
    Katsu's history quotes the threats that had been made on his life in response to his call 
for peace: "We will cut off Katsu Awa's head and offer it as a sacrifice to the God of War, as he 
is surrendering us into the hands of the enemy."46 At one point, as he attempted to dissuade 
Tokugawa troops from deserting, shots were fired in his direction, killing three men standing 
at his side. 
    Writing about this later on, he did not omit testimony of his own heroic resolve. "Not 
a shadow of doubt did I have that I was proceeding right. I resolved that if, in the imminent 
danger to the city, we could not save the innocent multitude, we should, at least, be the first 
to sacrifice ourselves."47 
    Katsu's narrative of his negotiations with Saigo Takamori over the surrender of Edo 
Castle on the thirteenth and fourteenth days of the third month, 1868, are of particular inter-
est to later historians. He argued that he proclaimed to Saigo, "If you are bent on threatening 
weak people with brutal force, we shall not shrink from accepting the challenge. Even as it 
is, we are making ourselves the laughing stock of foreign nations. If you will spare the city, I 
will be personally and officially grateful even unto death. When the Mikado is restored Edo 
will naturally become the capital of the new empire; the castle and its equipments are yours, 
and the land yielding millions of koku of rice to the House of Tokugawa can help supply 
administrative expenditure. Besides, as foreign complications are now pending, we must be 
aware that our helpless country does not follow the disastrous example and fate of India and 
similar conquered countries. In the face of a common danger internal strife should give place 
to patriotic harmony and helpfulness; and foreign countries seeing this, their faith in us will 
be strengthened and their friendship augmented."48 
     Katsu's arguments proved effective. "Saigo immediately countermanded the order for 
the assault contemplated on the city on the morrow, and I returned alone on horseback to 
report to Keiki. I was not surprised to be fired on three times, at dusk, as I approached my 
house. Fortunately the bullets passed over my head, and I escaped."49 
     The castle was surrendered without bloodshed, and Katsu reported that lenient treat-
ment was to be afforded the Tokugawa: "His Majesty, the Mikado, is graciously pleased to 
allow the said house to be perpetuated and leniently treated, and the life of Keiki to be spared 
in retirement and seclusion (at Shizuoka)."50 
     Katsu concluded his account by urging the imperial government to act with discretion, 
otherwise the new regime would be no better than the old, and would resemble the fable of 
a soldier who, "having fled from the enemy fifty steps, laughed at another soldier who had
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fled a hundred steps.... Future generations must not rest content with the meritorious deeds 
of the past, or abandon themselves to luxury and ease, satisfied simply with the restoration 
of the imperial power, but should lay broad and deep the foundations of a progressive and 
military nation, elevating by united effort their country's prestige in the Far East, and not 
forgetting to let their power be felt in the world. Such is my hope, and could I but see it real-
ized, I should not shudder at the thought of being beheaded or enduring any punishment, 
however severe."5i
Conservative Backlash
    Katsu's account of the Restoration placed primacy on decisions made by the Tokugawa 
side to protect national interests. He emphasized the importance of restraint and mediation. 
Moreover, his and other revisionist accounts that emerged in the 1880s downplayed the role 
played by young activists from Satsuma and Choshu and their quest to restore the emperor. 
As Carol Gluck notes, by the time of the promulgation of the Constitution in 1889, the 
terms "loyalty to the emperor" and "expel the barbarian" had lost their magic touch. The 
Restoration "had so diminished in meaning that it had practically to be reinvented in order to 
give modern Japan a historical first principle."52 New accounts placed emphasis on public and 
popular opinion, on the need for a "second restoration" to complete the fight against absolut-
ism, and, as in the case of Katsu Kaishu, on Tokugawa contributions to the new nation-state. 
In addition, the development of a modern school of critical history at Tokyo Imperial Univer-
sity threatened believers in a Japanese national essence (kokutai) centered on the emperor." 
    Conservative ideologues fought back. The Imperial Rescript on Education (1890), for 
example, could be used to stifle academic freedom; from the 1890s it became nearly impos-
sible to write about the imperial family except to extol it. In 1891, Kume Kunitake (1839-
1931), chair of the Department of History at Tokyo Imperial University, came under attack 
for asserting in a journal article that Shinto was simple nature worship and hinting that Japa-
nese imperial ancestors had Korean roots.54 More broadly, a number of conservative schol-
arly associations were founded in the late 1880s and 1890s, many of them dedicated to an 
elevation of Japan's unique emperor system and its history. In 1888, for example, Nishimura 
Shigeki (1828-1902) helped to found the Meiji Kai (Meiji Association); its journal, the 
Meiji-kai soshi, published a series of articles clarifying aspects of Japan's unique kokutai. That 
same year Miyake Setsurei (1860-1945), Shiga Shigetaka (1863-1927), and others founded 
the Seikyosha; its journal Nihonjin was dedicated to "the preservation of the national essence" 
(kokusui hozon).55 Of particular concern to historiographical debates was the establishment, 
in 1889, of the Ishin Kai (Restoration Association). Spearheaded by former daimyo from 
Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, and Mito as well as leading members of the court nobility (Sanjo, 
Iwakura, and Nakayama), the association was founded to collect and publish documents re-
lating to the "great achievement of the Meiji Restoration" (Meiji chuko no daigyo).56 The Ishin 
Kai professed academic neutrality, but as can be seen from its leadership, representing families 
active in the support of the imperial cause, the association lent its weight to the formation 
of an ideology of imperial loyalism. Its main activity was a mammoth oral history project. 
Between 1892 and the completion of the project in 1938, some 411 volumes of interviews 
with men and women connected with the Restoration were published. Despite its clear bias
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for the imperial side the Shidankai sokkiroku [Stenographic Records of Historical Narratives] 
continues to be an invaluable source for any study of the Meiji Restoration." 
    Fukuzawa Yukichi added his weight to arguments against the pro-Tokugawa version 
of the "fall of the bakufu." In 1891 he sent copies of a manuscript entitled "Yasegaman no 
setsu" (On Fighting to the Bitter End) to Katsu Kaishu, Enomoto Takeaki, Kimura Kaishu 
(1830-1901), Kurimoto Joun (1822-97) and other eminent survivors of the old regime.58 
The essay criticized Katsu and Enomoto for their failure "to fight to the bitter end" at the 
time of the Meiji Restoration. According to Fukuzawa, the peaceful surrender of Edo Castle 
was nothing but an expedient; in the long run Katsu's failure to rally Tokugawa troops had 
harmed Japan's martial spirit. 
     At that time (1868) I knew as well as Katsu that the weakened bakufu had no 
      chance of victory. Nonetheless, I also knew that, in order to maintain Japan's mar-
     tial spirit, the time was not right to make calculations over questions of victory or 
      defeat. The very survival of the nation was at stake. One may strive for victory and 
     be defeated, but there are few examples of people who strivefor defeat and gain 
      a victory. Katsu, however, had already adopted a defeatist position, and without 
     engaging the enemy gave orders for the ruling authorityof the Tokugawa family 
     to dissolve itself. He earnestly sued for peace, saying that people would be killed in 
     military action and property needlessly destroyed. While he sought to soften the 
      loss of life and wealth, he cannot escape blame from harming Japan's warrior spirit 
      of dogged endurance so vital to the make-up of the country.59 
    Katsu's active role in the Restoration reached its climax with the surrender of Edo Cas-
tle; to Fukuzawa this was a "shameful episode in our history." Fukuzawa worried that any 
praise of Katsu's efforts at peacemaking would not only slight Japanese national spirit (Yamato 
damashii), but dampen any enthusiasm among the people to fight on behalf of their country. 
"In the future how can we be certain to avoid a crisis brought on by threats from foreign 
countries? In such a crisis situation it will be no good to attempt to avoid hostilities. For those 
who hope, in the future, to make their country flourish and establish good relations with for-
eign countries, I should never wish them to study the events of our Restoration and adopt its 
expediencies."" Katsu, on the other hand, championed mediation, restraint, and peacemak-
ing as essential for the preservation and advancement of Japanese national integrity. 
    The two famous former bakufu retainers represent two diametrically opposed views 
of the Restoration as history and, at the same time, two contesting ways of relating past to 
present. Fukuzawa's essay on "fighting to the bitter end" relates directly to his concerns about 
Japanese foreign policy in the 1880s and early 1890s. Peaceful negotiations were no substitute 
for military readiness; Japanese citizens had to be prepared to sacrifice their lives in defense 
of their country. Katsu thought otherwise. He lamented the loss of life and thought that 
foreign wars in Asia would only benefit the Western powers. Cooperation, not contest, was 
necessary between the Asian states. As such, differing interpretations of the surrender of Edo 
Castle relate to a broader dispute over the nature of Japanese culture and its relations with 
the outside world.
310 M. William STEELE
Conclusion
    Katsu's treatment of the history of the Tokugawa army and navy and of late Tokugawa 
foreign policy similarly challenged the official narrative of the Meiji Restoration and offered a 
forum to criticize contemporary domestic and foreign policy. By quoting the 1863 objections 
to the vast amount of money spent transporting the shogun to Kyoto, for example, Katsu 
clearly had Japan in the late 1880s in mind: "High and low within the country have experi-
enced change in their patriotic sentiments to the extent that inequalities have arisen; tempers 
have flared and countrymen are at war with each other. Where this will lead is uncertain. Our 
national treasury is exhausted and expenses can only be obtained by squeezing out the blood 
and sweat of the poor people. Families will fall short of funds and both high and low will be 
in distress. In the end we will come to depend on foreign capital and all sense of direction 
of political and economic policy will be lost."61 Implicit in his treatment of the Tokugawa 
attempts at treaty revision during the 1860s was criticism of contemporary Japanese foreign 
policy under the direction of a government dominated by Satsuma and Choshu. For example, 
in his history of late Tokugawa diplomacy, Katsu reminded his readers that: "Much to the 
diplomatic and financial embarrassment of the bakufu, was it not the policy of two certain 
domains to carry out expulsion, fire on foreign ships, and make assassination attempts on the 
lives of foreign residents?" 
    As a historian in his later life, Katsu Kaishu was one of the first writers to link the Edo 
period with modern success in creating wealth and power. He traced the beginning of Japan's 
modernization to the period before the Meiji Restoration. Bakufu bureaucracy and bakufu 
laws had been responsible for a society at peace for over two hundred and fifty years. And it 
was the bakufu that opened the country: in the 1850s it inaugurated a policy of Westernizing 
the armed forces; it had begun schools of Western learning and had invited foreign specialists 
to help introduced new technologies; it had sent diplomatic missions to the United States and 
Europe and honed skills in diplomatic practice. Japan's success, Katsu implied, derived more 
from the Tokugawa legacy than from the restoration of imperial rule. Continuity, rather than 
change, was the keyword in Katsu's historiography of the Meiji Restoration. The late 1880s 
and early 1890s saw the birth of what Carol Gluck has called "Japan's modern myths." Katsu 
Kaishu and others similarly had their eyes on the past, but instead of an "invented past" theirs 
was more grounded in reality. Katsu argued that the legacy of the Edo period, rather than the 
legacy of Amaterasu Omikami, was the true origin of modern Japan. 
    At the same time, Katsu and other historians of the Meiji Restoration consciously re-
lated past to present. The controversy over the nature of the Meiji Restoration that emerged 
in the late 1880s and early 1890s reflected differing understandings of the range of foreign 
and domestic problems then confronting Japan. On the one hand, "conservative" interpreta-
tions of history, as Carol Gluck and Takashi Fujitani have shown, could and did legitimate 
a spirit of self-sacrifice and imperial service and encourage Japanese imperial ambitions. Ac-
counts of the Meiji Restoration by Katsu Kaishu and other historians gave more positive 
press to the Tokugawa past; sakoku (seclusion) was not its legacy, but peace, stability, and 
even openness to innovation when in the national interest. Moreover, Katsu argued strongly 
on the need to uphold reason over emotion. Similar to the situation confronting Japan in 
the late 1860s, Japan in the early 1890s should not carelessly enter into hostilities. Instead
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of the dream to make Japan into a military power replete with colonies, Katsu derived from 
the past arguments on behalf of tolerance, restraint, and Asian brotherhood. Like Fukuzawa, 
Katsu looked back to the men of Mikawa, but instead of the spirit of "fighting to the bitter 
end," he championed their advocacy of patience and restraint (nintai fubatsu) as a means to 
overcome all difficulties." 
    Finally,in 1897, two years before his death, Katsu once again used history to criticize 
the government's failure to respond adequately. This time the current problems were pollu-
tion and flooding caused by the Ashio Copper Mine. "The present government is supposed to 
be civilized, while the bakufu is supposed to have been barbarian, but look what the so-called 
civilized government is doing to the people in Ashio.... Is not civilization something that 
accords with principle and makes sure the people do not fall into harm's way?"63 In this and 
in other historical debates, neither side, of course, is entirely correct. History is interpretation 
and also often social comment. Katsu Kaishu contested the "official" record with contempo-
rary issues in mind. Historians still, even now at the outset of the twenty-first century, con-
tinue to debate the meaning of the Meiji Restoration-and they continue to find relevance 
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